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TOWARD AN ACCOUNTABILITY-BASED
DEFINITION OF “MERCENARY”
RYAN M. SCOVILLE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Mercenary violence is an increasingly serious threat to international
security.1 From a legal perspective, the development of this threat is
problematic because the international treaties that regulate “mercenar-
ies” operate on a flawed definition of the concept. Even themost recent
definition neither accounts for changes in global security over the past
decade nor reflects the fundamental problem with mercenaries—the
fact that they are not state-accountable actors. These deficiencies have
contributed to the spread of mercenary activity by complicating treaty
enforcement and undermining state support for the current law.
This Note therefore proposes a new definition of “mercenary.” The
proposed definition expands the range of activity in which mercenaries
participate and abandons elements of the existing definition that do
not relate to accountability.
Part I provides context for this proposal, first by describing how a
combination of geopolitical, economic, and legal influences has caused
an expansion of mercenary activity since the end of the Cold War. The
Part then explains why this expansion should be a source of concern
for the international community, arguing that although mercenaries
are often rightly viewed as problematic because of their propensity to
commit abuses and contribute to instability, the harms of mercenary
violence are best understood as byproducts of the more fundamental
problem that mercenaries are not accountable to national govern-
ments. Part I concludes by outlining existing international legal efforts
to define and regulate mercenaries, focusing in particular on the
International Convention Against the Use, Recruitment, Financing
and Training of Mercenaries.
Part II critiques the existing international legal definition of “merce-
* Law clerk designate to the Honorable Neil V. Wake, U.S. District Court for the District of
Arizona; J.D., Stanford Law School; B.A., Brigham Young University. The author wishes to thank
Jim Hanson, Sebastian Kaplan-Sears, and Allen Weiner for their comments on earlier drafts.
1. See DEBORAH D. AVANT, THE MARKET FOR FORCE 8 (2005) (“News reports of mercenary
and/or private security activity have mushroomed.”); Montgomery Sapone, Have Rifle with Scope,
Will Travel: The Global Economy of Mercenary Violence, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1 (1999) (“[T]he
international black market of military services is flourishing.”).
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nary” for containing several requirements that should be irrelevant due
to lack of any connection to the fundamental issue of accountability,
for unnecessarily complicating treaty enforcement, and for being
under-inclusive. In particular, the Part takes issue with three compo-
nents of the existing definition: (1) the limiting condition that merce-
naries must operate with the specific intent to undermine the security
of a state; (2) the requirement that mercenaries operate for profit; and
(3) the requirement that mercenaries be neither nationals nor resi-
dents of the government which they target.
Finally, Part III offers an alternative definition of “mercenary” and
assesses its merits and deficiencies. The most prominent feature of the
proposed definition is that it makes absence of accountability to a state
the fundamental determinant of mercenary status. The definition
extends the possibility of this status to unaccountable individuals who
are specifically recruited even in non-traditional security contexts, and
it abandons the requirements of profit motive, non-nationality, and
non-residency. It is argued that incorporating such a definition would
enable international law to more effectively control mercenary vio-
lence.
II. CONTEXT
A. The Rise of Mercenarism
The end of the Cold War was the catalyst for the growth of modern
mercenarism. Analysts provide several explanations for this conclusion.
First, on the supply side, the United States and Soviet Union found it
more difficult to support massive military budgets in the absence of the
superpower rivalry. Consequent budget reductions caused personnel
layoffs and forced trained soldiers to look for private employment. For
these individuals, mercenary activity was a logical source of income.2
Second, on the demand side, the end of the Cold War initially allowed
the United States and Russia to show less concern for the security of
weak states. In many cases, this treatment forced weak states to fend for
themselves. A common strategy was to employ private sources of
security to supplement small and frequently poorly trained national
2. See ABDEL-FATAU MUSAH, MERCENARIES: AN AFRICAN SECURITY DILEMMA, 3-4 (2000); U.K.
FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES: OPTIONS FOR REGULATION, 2001-2,
H.C. 577, at 12, available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/mercenaries,0.pdf [hereinafter
U.K. Green Paper].
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armies.3 Third, mercenary organizations arguably have been able to
proliferate by repackaging their roughhewn, soldier-of-fortune images
into the euphemistic form of the “private security firm.”4 These firms
have employed traditional corporate hierarchies and have combined
professionalism and effective marketing techniques to gain an increas-
ingly significant role in the provision of security.5 The general move-
ment toward privatization in the wake of the Cold War created favor-
able conditions for these firms by emphasizing the efficiency of the
private sector over government.6 Finally, and most importantly for our
purposes, “one of the greatest problems in combating mercenary
activities is the absence of a clear, unambiguous and comprehensive
legal definition of a mercenary.”7 The absence of an effective definition
has undermined support for the relevant international treaties and
complicated law enforcement efforts.8
As a result of these influences, mercenary activity has been observed
in a large number of conflicts over the last decade.9 States or militant
non-state organizations have reportedly employed mercenaries in
3. Doug Brooks, Messiahs or Mercenaries? The Future of International Military Services, 7 INT’L
PEACEKEEPING 129, 132 (2000).
4. James R. Coleman, Constraining ModernMercenarism, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1493, 1499 (2004); see
also AVANT, supra note 1, at 29-30.
5. See Ellen L. Frye, Private Military Firms in the NewWorld Order: How Redefining “Mercenary” Can
Tame the “Dogs of War,” 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2607, 2608-10, 2618-19 (2005); Jon D. Michaels, Beyond
Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1001, 1022 (2004).
6. AVANT, supra note 1, at 35-38.
7. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on the Use of
Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to
Self-Determination, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/15 (Dec. 24, 2003) (prepared by Enrique B.
Ballesteros) [hereinafter Report on Mercenaries 2003]. For a general critique of current definitions,
see P.W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law,
42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 521, 524 (2004) (“[T]he very definitions that international law uses to
identify mercenaries include a series of vague . . . requirements, such that it is nearly impossible to
find anyone in any place who fulfills all of the criteria . . . . Thus, the underlying legal concepts
that would support any guiding parameters establishing the privatized military industry’s place in
the law are often of little assistance.”).
8. See generally U.K. Green Paper, supra note 2 (discussing the limitations of the existing
definitions of “mercenary” and also recent developments in private military violence).
9. One commentator states that the “mercenary world is permanently awash with activity”
and that “[f]reelance mercenaries have been reported as participating in almost every recent
conflict over the past ten years.” James Larry Taulbee, Mercenaries, Private Armies and Security
Companies in Contemporary Policy, 37 INT’L POL. 433, 433-34 (2000).
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Chechnya,10 Georgia,11 Sierra Leone,12 Papua New Guinea,13 Azerbai-
jan,14 Tajikistan,15 and Equitorial Guinea,16 among others.17 Some
have even argued that U.S.-based private security firms in Iraq are
mercenaries.18 While many of these reports are based on colloquial
notions of mercenarism, rather than the definition established under
international law, the reports still reflect a broader post-Cold War
erosion of states’ monopoly on the use of force.19 The rise of terrorism,
international narcotics organizations, and private police and security
firms are some indicia of this trend.
B. The Problem of Unaccountability
Many commentators have argued that the presence of mercenaries
in military conflicts correlates with human rights abuses, threatens state
sovereignty, and contributes to various forms of international criminal
10. Sergei Ostanin, Some 2,000 Mercenaries Fight in Chechnya, THE RUSSIAN INFO. AGENCY
ITAR-TASS (RUSS.), May 23, 1996.
11. See ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries as a
Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, ¶¶
78-86, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/23 (Jan. 12, 1994) (prepared by Enrique B. Ballesteros) [hereinaf-
ter Report on Mercenaries 1994].
12. Report on Mercenaries 2003, supra note 7, ¶¶ 22-23.
13. British Mercenary Asked to Help Free Hostages, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Mar. 9, 1996.
14. Karabakh Army Strong Enough to Fight Azerbaijan, BBC MONITORING TRANS-CAUCASUS, Nov.
13, 2004.
15. 8 UN Observers Are Kidnapped by Mercenaries amid New Unrest, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 21, 1996, at 4.
16. ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of Peoples to Self-Determination ¶¶ 34-45, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/14 (Dec. 8, 2004) (prepared by Shaista Shameem) [hereinafter Report on Mercenaries
2004].
17. See, e.g., ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, ¶¶ 48-61,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/27 (Jan. 17, 1996) (prepared by Enrique B. Ballesteros) (describing
mercenary activity in the Islamic Federal Republic of the Comoros) [hereinafter Report on
Mercenaries 1996].
18. Leslie Wayne, America’s For-Profit Secret Army, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, at A1.
19. See Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in
Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879, 881 (2004) (noting that private armies “challenge[] . . . one of
our most fundamental, venerated axioms of liberal thought—the idea that ‘the state’ has, must
have, or should have a ‘monopoly of force.’”); cf. Anna Leander, Globalisation and the State Monopoly
on the Legitimate Use of Force 14-16 (Syddansk Universitet [University of Southern Denmark],
Politologiske Skrifter [Pol. Sci. Pubs.] No. 7, 2004) (Den.), available at http://www.sam.sdu.dk/
politics/publikationer/anl7.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2006) (arguing that, while states still claim a
monopoly on the legitimate use of force, the concept of “monopoly” has changed to mean that
states are simply entitled to regulate the privatization of coercion).
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activity such as terrorism and narcotics trafficking.20 However, these
problems are only secondary manifestations of the fundamental prob-
lem with mercenaries—they are not state-accountable actors.21 To the
extent that mercenaries are more likely to commit abuses, it is largely
because they operate secretly and separately from the armed forces of a
state and are thus relatively immune to the taming influences of public
opinion and national law.22 The mobility of mercenaries allows them to
elude sanction even when states seek punishment, and it mitigates
national and cultural ties that might otherwise discipline the use of
force.23 Mercenaries may also be more likely to undermine state
sovereignty because no external authority curbs a mercenary’s decision
to use force. By contrast, diplomatic relations, institutions such as the
Security Council, and international law at least marginally constrain
state action in this realm.24
Scholarship on public administration is fruitful territory for under-
standing precisely howmercenaries lack accountability. Scholars in this
area generally25 define “accountability” as a synonym for “answerabil-
ity”;26 to be accountable is to be “answerable to authority that can
mandate desirable conduct and sanction conduct that breaches identi-
fied obligations.”27 More specifically, the term can be viewed as having
the following requisite components: “a higher authority vested with
responsibility for oversight or supervision; a criterion or measure used
by the higher authority to assess performance or compliance; a mecha-
20. See, e.g., David Isenberg, Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.: Profile of Today’s Private Sector Corporate
Mercenary Firms (Summer 1997) (unpublished manuscript, Center for Defense Information
Working Paper), http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/isd03/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
21. See Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security
Companies, International Law, and the New World Disorder, 34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 75, 119 (1998) (arguing
that “the crucial factors distinguishing acceptable and unacceptable types of military services
offered by foreigners are transparency and state accountability.”).
22. Isenberg, supra note 20.
23. See Sapone, supra note 1, at 3-4.
24. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of
International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469 (2005) (arguing that the potential legal and collateral
consequences of treaty violation operate as incentives for states to comply with treaties).
25. Scholars frequently debate about the meaning of “accountability” and disagree about
how to properly measure the concept. See Robert Gregory, Accountability in Modern Government, in
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 557, 566 (B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre eds., 2003) (agreeing
with the proposition that accountability is “one of the most basic yet most intractable of political
concepts.”).
26. See, e.g., id. at 558-59.
27. Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1229, 1260 (2003).
DEFINITION OF “MERCENARY”
2006] 545
nism for reporting compliance to the higher authority; and, the
prospect of penalty or reward based on performance.”28 In an organiza-
tional context, accountability may exist both within an organization
and between an organization and an external authority.29
Accountability has a variety of potential sources. With regard to the
use of force, Robert Keohane argues that there are eight such sources,
four of which are relevant for our analysis: hierarchical accountability,
legal accountability, market accountability, and public-reputational
accountability.30 Hierarchical accountability applies to relationships
within organizations and exists when superiors are able to guide and
discipline their subordinates.31 Legal accountability refers to the “re-
quirement that agents abide by formal rules and be prepared to justify
their actions in those terms, in courts or quasi-judicial arenas.”32
Market accountability, on the other hand, exists with regard “to princi-
pals . . . whose influence on their agent is exercised in whole or in part
throughmarkets, and the information communicated through them.”33
This form of accountability exists, for example, when investors are able
to sell stock and reduce access to capital for firms that make poor
business decisions. Finally, public-reputational accountability “is meant
to apply in situations in which reputation, widely and publicly known,
provides a mechanism” for restraining and directing behavior even in
the absence of other sources of accountability.34 The effectiveness of
each form of accountability varies based on context. For example,
market accountability will be less effective for privately-held corpora-
tions than for public corporations, and the efficacy of public-
reputational accountability will vary based on the accuracy and availabil-
ity of relevant information.
28. Kevin P. Kearns, Accountability in a Seamless Economy, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRA-
TION, supra note 25, at 581, 583.
29. Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 1422, 1422-23 (2003).
30. Robert O. Keohane, The Concept of Accountability in World Politics and the Use of Force, 24
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1121, 1131-33 (2003). Other scholars describe similar sources. See, e.g., Barbara S.
Romzek & Patricia W. Ingraham, Cross Pressures of Accountability: Initiative, Command, and Failure in
the Ron Brown Plane Crash, 60 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 240 (2000) (identifying four types of accountability:
hierarchical, legal, professional, and political).
31. Keohane, supra note 30, at 1131.
32. Id. at 1132. This form of accountability may be established through contracts and
licenses. For a description of legal accountability and its mechanisms, see Kearns, supra note 28, at
584-85.
33. Keohane, supra note 30, at 1132.
34. Id. at 1134.
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Under most of the categories that Keohane identifies, colloquially-
defined mercenaries are almost entirely unaccountable actors. First,
hierarchical, market, and public-reputational accountability are at best
occasional constraints on mercenary decisionmaking. Mercenaries that
operate in small groups or alone will necessarily face little or no
hierarchical accountability. With larger mercenary organizations, this
form of accountability will not function effectively when the hierarchy
and its rules are not clearly defined. And in either situation, even
disciplinedmercenary leaders may not be able to prevent their subordi-
nates from using force inappropriately. Mercenaries similarly encoun-
ter very little market accountability, as few traditional mercenary orga-
nizations have shareholders or other investors who may discipline
decisions regarding the use of violence.35 Public-reputational account-
ability is likewise problematic, as mercenary operations are usually
cloaked in some level of secrecy.36 The result is that timely information
on mercenary operations will likely be unavailable to the public,
inaccurate, or some combination of both. Even assuming that informa-
tion poses no problem, moreover, public opinion is fickle and even
irrelevant.37 While the public may oppose some mercenary operations,
it may just as easily support others when the perceived purpose is
legitimate; either way, public support may be irrelevant to themercenar-
ies themselves.
Second, neither the market, nor private organizational hierarchies,
nor public opinion necessarily renders mercenaries accountable to
states—the traditional locus of military capacity. This is important
because even if a mercenary organization renders its members hierar-
chically accountable, and even if mercenary leaders are accountable to
the market or public opinion, these sources of accountability may at
times push mercenaries toward activity that is at odds with state policy.
Effective hierarchical accountability may run counter to state interests,
for example, when the leader of a mercenary organization orders his
35. But seeMichaels, supra note 5, at 1020-23 (noting inter alia some shift toward corporatiza-
tion in the provision of private military services).
36. See ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries as a
Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, ¶¶
32, 64-65, 78, U.N. Doc. A/50/390 (Aug. 29, 1995) (prepared by Enrique B. Ballesteros) [hereinaf-
ter Report on Mercenaries 1995].
37. See Karen A. Mingst, Domestic Political Factors and Decisions to Use Military Forces, in
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 61, 70-73 (Charlotte Ku
& Harold K. Jacobson eds., 2002) (arguing in the context of government policy that public
opinion often evolves to support the status quo). Mingst’s argument illustrates one way in which
public opinion can be unsteady.
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subordinates to conduct attacks on government forces.38 Market ac-
countability is similarly unhelpful because, to the extent that it exists,
shareholders’ desires for profit may encourage mercenary firms to use
violence even when state policy dictates otherwise.39 Finally, public
opinionmay encouragemercenary activity against an unpopular govern-
ment or other targets deemed blameworthy by a belligerent group.
Most importantly for our purposes, because of deficiencies in current
international law,40 many mercenaries are also de facto legally unaccount-
able. Commentators have widely criticized the existing international trea-
ties on mercenaries as ineffective due to poor drafting and weak adher-
ence.41 Yet, it is important to realize that these critiques apply to the law as
it now exists rather than to any inherent limits to legal accountability; law
in abstract is in fact far less problematic than any other source of account-
ability for mercenaries. Effective legal accountability conforms the use of
violence to state interests, and it is muchmore likely to govern consistently
the use of force by private actors. For these reasons, it is important to
redefine “mercenary” in a way that improves the efficacy of current
international law and renders mercenaries legally accountable to states.
C. The U.N. Convention
Two international42 treaties regulate the evolving problem of merce-
narism: Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
38. Machiavelli argues that effective mercenary leaders are in fact uniquely likely to disobey
state orders, since these leaders “aspire to their own greatness” rather than that of their state
employer. NICOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 40 (George Bull trans., Penguin Classics 2d ed. 2003).
39. Assuming for a moment that private military firms are in fact mercenary, this form of
accountability may be particularly weak because, in many cases, investors will derive proportionally
greater profit from higher levels of military activity. Unscrupulous investors may have strong
incentives to demand military engagement wherever and whenever possible. See Leander, supra
note 19, at 17 (concluding that “market discipline and self-regulation have a poor record” in the
private military industry). Moreover, even assuming that a firm’s investors are socially-minded
rather than purely driven by profit, information on the social utility of a firm’s military activities
will be unavailable in many cases, making it difficult for investors to punish firms that engage in
socially disadvantageous operations. See Archon Fung, Making Social Markets: Dispersed Governance
and Corporate Accountability, inMARKET-BASED GOVERNANCE 145, 158-59 (John D. Donahue & Joseph
S. Nye, Jr. eds., 2002).
40. See infra Part III.
41. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 7, at 524.
42. The Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa also regulates mercenary
violence, but that treaty’s membership is limited to African states. See OAU Convention for the
Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, July 3, 1977, OAU Doc. CM/817 (XXIX), Annex II (3d
rev.), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/485?OpenDocument [hereinafter OAUCon-
vention].
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(Protocol I),43 and the International Convention Against the Recruit-
ment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (U.N. Conven-
tion).44 Protocol I, which entered into force in 1978, only briefly
addresses the issue. Article 47(1) in effect punishes the status of
“mercenary” by establishing categorically that mercenaries “shall not
have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war.”45 Article 47(2)
then defines the term “mercenary.”46 Because Protocol I only regulates
international armed conflicts, its provisions in most cases do not apply
to mercenaries involved in civil wars or other forms of internal strife.47
43. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 47, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Protocol I].
44. U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 43, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/34 (Dec. 4, 1989) (entered
into force Oct. 20, 2001) [hereinafter U.N. Convention].
45. Protocol I, supra note 43, art. 47(1).
46. The definition states:
A mercenary is any person who:
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed
conflict;
(b) Does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
(c) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for
private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the
conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised
or paid to combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces
of that Party;
(d) Is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory
controlled by a Party to the conflict;
(e) Is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
(f) Has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official
duty as a member of its armed forces.
Id. art. 47(2).
47. “International armed conflict” refers to any case of “declared war or of any other armed
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties [to the Geneva
Conventions], even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.” See Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art.
2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 2, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
Protocol I’s definition of “international armed conflict” covers not only the conflicts described in
common article 2, but also the “armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of
self-determination.” See Protocol I, supra note 43, art. 1(4). Under the Geneva Conventions, the
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The result is that a state party must deny lawful combatant and P.O.W.
status to a mercenary in the context of an international armed conflict,
but it may confer these statuses in a non-international armed conflict.
At the time of its adoption, Article 47 was significant because it broke
from the prior legal approach to mercenaries, which was to condition
the legality of mercenary activity on the existence of an agency relation-
ship between the private soldier and his state sponsor.48 Instead of
permitting mercenary agents for national governments and criminaliz-
ing only non-state-sponsored mercenaries, the Article 47 definition
indirectly punishes the recruitment of private soldiers for violent
purposes by denying lawful combatant and P.O.W. status regardless of
sponsorship.49
Protocol I enjoys broader adherence than the U.N. Convention,50
but the latter, which entered into force in 2001, represents a far more
significant attempt to eliminatemercenary violence. Protocol I criminal-
izes both “mercenaries . . . who participate directly in hostilities or in a
concerted act of violence” and “[a]ny person who recruits, uses,
finances, or trains mercenaries.”51 Drafters of the Convention incorpo-
rated verbatim the definition of “mercenary” that is employed in
legal status of mercenaries is undecided in any conflict that does not fit into one of the above
categories.
48. Article 4(A)(4) of Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(POW) entitles to P.O.W. status “[p]ersons who accompany the armed forces without actually
being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents,
supply contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed
forces, provided that they have received authorization, from the armed forces which they
accompany.” Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. One could reasonably argue that state-sponsored mercenar-
ies fell within the scope of these terms, at least until Protocol I entered into force. See Arthur John
Armstrong, Mercenaries and Freedom Fighters: The Legal Regime of the Combatant Under Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 30 JAG J. 125, 159-61 (1978).
49. For the sake of topical focus, this Note brackets debates about the proper punishment for
mercenaries and whether international law should punish the mere status of “mercenary” as
opposed to acts of “mercenarism.” For a general critique of Article 47’s approach of withholding
lawful combatant and prisoner-of-war status from mercenaries, see Armstrong, supra note 48.
50. One hundred ninety-three states are party to Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions. See
Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], States Party to the Geneva Conventions and Their Additional
Protocols, http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/party_gc (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
By contrast, only 28 states have signed and ratified the U.N. Convention. See ICRC, International
Humanitarian Law: International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id!530&ps!P (last visited Dec. 8,
2005).
51. Protocol I, supra note 43, arts. 2-3.
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Protocol I and added language52 that expands the variety of situations
in which mercenary activity may occur. For enforcement, the U.N.
Convention establishes a try-or-extradite regime that obligates states
parties to prosecute or extradite alleged offenders present in their
respective territories.53 Other provisions mandate information shar-
ing54 and mutual assistance55 between states parties in order to facili-
tate prosecution. Unlike Protocol I, the U.N. Convention applies
regardless of whether a mercenary is involved in an international or
non-international armed conflict.
Proponents of the U.N. Convention’s definition of “mercenary”
argued that it was an overdue replacement for the Protocol I defini-
tion.56 The problem, they believed, was that Protocol I emerged from
an idiosyncratic Cold War security context. When European powers
52. The U.N. Convention, supra note 44, uses the exact text of the Protocol I definition and
then also states:
A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation:
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in
a concerted act of violence aimed at:
(i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the con-
stitutional order of a State; or
(ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a State;
(b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for significant
private gain and is prompted by the promise or payment of material
compensation;
(c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such an act
is directed;
(d) Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and
(e) Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory the
act is undertaken.
Id. art. 1(2).
53. See id. art. 12 (“The State Party in whose territory the alleged offender is found shall, if it
does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence
was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State. Those authorities
shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature
under the law of that State.”).
54. Id. art. 10(2).
55. Id. art. 13(1) (“States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance
in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of the offences set forth in the
present Convention, including the supply of all evidence at their disposal necessary for the
proceedings. The law of the State whose assistance is requested shall apply in all cases.”).
56. See Todd S. Millard, Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate Private
Military Companies, 176 MIL. L. REV. 1, 57 (2003).
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retreated frommany of their colonies during the 1960s and 1970s, they
left power vacuums that quickly produced instability and, in many
cases, war.57 The presence of private soldiers often exacerbated these
conflicts. At times, the soldiers were present because opponents to a
new regime would hire them, or because foreign states with an interest
in the conflict would send them.58 In other situations, new govern-
ments would actively recruit the soldiers to bolster state defenses.59
Undefined in positive international law at the time, private soldiers
participated in conflicts in the Congo, Guinea, and Benin, among
others.60 The African states that suffered from these conflicts re-
sponded by lobbying intensely for international regulation61 and then,
after some dissatisfaction with the resulting adoption of Protocol I,
drafting a regional anti-mercenary treaty of their own.62
While an important victory at the time, Protocol I was drafted during
an era when states and policymakers viewed the sources of insecurity
more narrowly than they do today. Realism and notions of state
primacy predominated during the 1960s and 1970s. Most theories
viewed security and insecurity as emerging almost entirely from the
state itself—the former through an adequate military defense and the
latter often through arms races and interstate wars. The concept of
security was thus narrowly defined; policymakers and academics thought
of it as a low or absent risk of warfare between states.63 In this context,
Article 47(2)(a)’s requirement that the mercenary be recruited in
order to “fight in an [international] armed conflict” (emphasis added)
made sense. Application of the concept of “mercenary” to other
contexts would have been an overreaction to violence that did not
implicate vital state interests.
Since the waning years of the Cold War, however, the concept of
57. SeeMUSAH, supra note 2, at 4.
58. Report on Mercenaries 1995, supra note 36, ¶ 32 (describing how mercenaries have
historically been used in Africa for this and other purposes).
59. Kofi Oteng Kufuor, The OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism and Civil
Conflicts, inMERCENARIES, supra note 2, at 198.
60. Id. at 199.
61. Organization of African Unity, Declaration on the Activities of Mercenaries in Africa, ¶ 9, OAU
Doc. CM/St.6 (XVII) (June 23, 1971), available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/
Documents/Decisions/com/xCoM_1971b.pdf.
62. Singer, supra note 7, at 528.
63. See Ronnie D. Lipschutz, On Security, inON SECURITY 1, 5 (Ronnie D. Lipschutz ed., 1995)
(describing the traditional state-centric concept of security that is focused on self-defense and
war).
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security has become more amorphous;64 threats to security are both
perceptually and actually more varied. Terrorism, ethnic conflict,
international narcotics organizations, and competition for scarce re-
sources are thought of as relatively new, or at least increasingly promi-
nent, sources of insecurity with which the international community
must cope.65 The U.N. Convention was a response to this evolution. A
mercenary under the treaty may not only be a person who “fight[s] in
an [international] armed conflict,” as in Protocol I, but also any person
who, “in any other situation,” is recruited to participate in violence
aimed at “[o]verthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the
constitutional order of a state,” or at “[u]ndermining the territorial
integrity of a state.”66 Thus, as long as the other definitional conditions
were met, “mercenary” could conceivably refer to terrorists, operatives
in drug cartels, and other non-traditional security threats.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT DEFINITION
Drafters of the U.N. Convention were right to expand the definition
of “mercenary” to cover more non-traditional security threats. But they
did not produce a definition without other significant shortcomings.
The Convention’s definition suffers from two general deficiencies.
First, drafters failed to incorporate fully their insight on non-traditional
security threats. As a result, the Convention is incapable of regulating
some blameworthy activity that is analytically difficult to distinguish
from traditional mercenary violence. Second, the drafters inserted
practically and normatively irrelevant requirements into the definition
that render the Convention difficult to enforce. These shortcomings
are apparent both from the text and from the fact that the treaty has
only obtained twenty-eight signatories—none of whom are major pow-
ers67—in the sixteen years since it was opened for signature and
64. Id. at 1-23.
65. See generally Jessica Tuchman Matthews, Redefining Security, FOREIGN AFF., Spring 1989, at
162 (making this argument with respect to environmental problems); Stephen J. Randall, United
States-Latin American Relations in the Post-Cold War, Post-9-11 Years, J. MIL. & STRATEGIC STUD.,
Summer 2004, available at http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/jmss/jmss_2004/v6n4/jmss_v6n4d.pdf
(describing how the United States and Latin American countries have shifted toward a concept of
security that focuses on issues such as terrorism, WMD proliferation, and narcotics trafficking).
66. Compare Protocol I, supra note 43, art. 47(2)(a), with U.N. Convention, supra note 44, art.
1(2)(a).
67. See ICRC, International Humanitarian Law: International Convention Against the Recruitment,
Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, supra note 50 (listing the following as states parties:
Azerbaijan, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Georgia, Guinea,
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ratification. The following section assesses shortcomings in the U.N.
Convention’s definition of “mercenary” with the aim of producing a
definition that is both analytically sound and capable of garnering
broader state support.
A. The Definition Limits the Treaty’s Ability to Combat Both Traditional
and Non-Traditional Security Threats
TheU.N. Convention extends the definition of “mercenary” to contexts
of non-traditional security threats by stating that mercenaries may exist in
armed conflict or “any other situation.”68 In doing so, the treaty proscribes
the use of mercenaries even in situations other than international armed
conflict. A mercenary could theoretically be an individual who uses
violence that suppresses an unarmed civilian population during the course
of a civil war, cripples an enemy’s economy or physical infrastructure, or
exploits a scarce resource. This is a useful innovation over the Protocol I
definition, but the Convention still requires that the legally cognizable
mercenary possess a traditional aim. The Convention states that merce-
nary violence must be aimed at either “overthrowing a Government or
otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a State,” or “undermin-
ing the territorial integrity of a state.”69
One problem with this language is that non-state-accountable vio-
lence may still be undesirable even if it does not have the aim of
undermining a state’s territorial integrity or overthrowing a govern-
ment and its constitutional order. By excluding from the definition of
“mercenary” private fighters who aim to achieve all other outcomes,
such as assisting a criminal organization or defeating a non-state
enemy, the Convention limits the international community’s ability to
combat less traditional sources of insecurity. This is troubling because
colloquially-defined mercenaries have “been [observed] in such activi-
ties as arms and drug trafficking, illicit trafficking in general, terrorism,
. . . acts related to forcible control of valuable natural resources, selec-
tive assassination, abduction and other organized criminal activities.”70
It is doubtful that all of these activities necessarily aim to overthrow
Italy, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, New Zealand, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Suriname, Togo, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uruguay, and
Uzbekistan).
68. U.N. Convention, supra note 44, art. 1(2).
69. Id. art. 1(2)(a).
70. Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of
Peoples to Self-Determination, ¶ 54(g), U.N. Doc. A/15/115 (July 2, 2003) (prepared by Enrique B.
Ballesteros).
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governments, undermine states’ territorial integrity, or jeopardize
states’ constitutional orders. Many of these actions will not occur on a
scale large enough that prosecuting authorities could persuasively
argue such a grandiose aim was present. Because recruitment of
individual mercenaries will in many cases have a more proximate and
limited aim, the definition forces prosecutors to argue, first, that the
mercenary was recruited for the purpose of achieving the proximate
aim and, second, that the proximate aim was in fact part of a more
general aim to overthrow a government, undermine a state’s constitu-
tional order, or undermine a state’s territorial integrity. This require-
ment is overly restrictive because alternative or more proximate aims
will in many cases be independently blameworthy. It should be enough
to prove that the aim of the recruitment was to facilitate an activity that
is criminal under any existing international law.
Another problem with the current language is that private military
activity can undermine the constitutional order or territorial integrity
of a state even when recruitment does not aim to produce these effects.
While the travaux pre´paratoires are unclear about precisely what the
Convention’s drafters meant by “aimed,” the Oxford English Dictio-
nary states that to “aim” is “to calculate, devise, arrange, [or] plan.”71
Plain meaning therefore suggests that “aim” creates a specific intent
requirement: the recruiter has to intentionally recruit with the precise
purpose of using her recruits to commit violence for the accomplish-
ment of one of the enumerated ends. Subsequent U.N. General
Assembly resolutions72 and Article 1(2)’s use of terms such as “specially
recruited” and “purpose” lend support to this interpretation.73
With a specific-intent requirement, the Convention fails to reach
intentional activity that only knowingly causes regime collapse, or that
knowingly violates a state’s constitutional order or territorial integrity.
For example, assume X is a nongovernmental party in an ethnic
conflict that hires a private military to harass and suppress rival clan Y.
Article 1(1) of the Convention does not apply because there is, at least
initially, no “armed conflict”; violence has not escalated. Article 1(2)
also does not apply because X did not hire the private military with the
71. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), available at http://www.oed.com.
72. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 52/122, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/112 (Feb. 18,
1998) (“Recalling also all of its relevant resolutions in which . . . it condemned any State that
permitted or tolerated the recruitment, financing, training, assembly, transit and use of mercenar-
ies with the objective [emphasis mine] of overthrowing the Governments of States Members of the
United Nations . . . .”).
73. U.N. Convention, supra note 44, art. 1(2)(a).
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aim of overthrowing a government, undermining a state’s constitu-
tional order, or undermining a state’s territorial integrity. These are at
best the effects of X’s use of private fighters against its enemy, and the
U.N. Convention cannot serve as a basis for prosecution.
Beside the fact that it complicates treaty enforcement, the specific-
intent requirement is also problematic under deterrence and retribu-
tive theories of punishment. From a deterrence standpoint, the specific-
intent requirement is counterproductive because it makes prosecution
more difficult. For retributivists, specific-intent requirements are appro-
priate only when an actor’s moral culpability hinges on whether or not
she specifically intended to commit a given crime. For mercenaries,
however, specific intent and moral culpability do not closely correlate.
Private soldiers who fight knowing that they are violating a state’s
constitutional order or undermining its territorial integrity are at least
blameworthy for consciously violating the long-esteemed rights and
powers that those concepts embody. If anything, the presence or
absence of specific intent should determine the level of punishment,
not whether punishment is appropriate.
B. Profit Motive Should Be Irrelevant
Historically, the defining feature of mercenaries has been their
motive to use violence for private material gain.74 The commentary for
Protocol I clarifies that many drafters thought this motive was the
critical feature of the Article 47 definition.75 All of the relevant interna-
tional treaties contain some form of a profit-motive requirement.76
Legal commentators, moreover, have broadly accepted the centrality of
profit motive in the definition of mercenary.77
It is not clear, however, why profit motive should be such a crucial
feature to the definition. First, members of national militaries often
serve for the purpose of private gain. In the United States, scholarship
arrangements, advertisements depicting service as a successful career
path, and the chance at a stable source of income draw large numbers
74. See, e.g., 3 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS ch. 2, § 13 (Joseph Chitty trans.,
1834) (1758) (defining mercenaries as “foreigners voluntarily engaging to serve the state for
money, or a stipulated pay.”).
75. Protocol I, supra note 43, cmt. ¶1807 (noting that for the “protagonists of [Article
47(2)(c),] this is the crux of the matter.”).
76. SeeU.N. Convention, supra note 44, arts. 1(1)(b) & 1(2)(b); Protocol I, supra note 43, art.
47(2)(c); OAU Convention, supra note 42, art. 1(c).
77. SeeMillard, supra note 56, at 6.
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of citizens to the armed forces.78 Presumably, at least some recruits who
participate in actual combat serve solely due to monetary incentives.
Yet no one characterizes this type of recruit as mercenary or even
particularly morally blameworthy. From this it is clear that the willing-
ness to use violence in exchange for private monetary gain is not
inherently inappropriate under the law. The reason, it seems, is that a
profit motive does not reliably indicate the absence of accountability.
Even when a recruit is motivated primarily by a desire for private gain,
mechanisms such as formal training, a strict hierarchy, and the possibil-
ity of criminal sanction for misconduct will constrain his or her
behavior. These mechanisms are accepted as sufficient to make the
private profit motive unproblematic because they cumulatively make
misconduct unlikely, even when the soldier lacks national and other
loyalties.
Second, and as noted above,79 the problematic effects of mercenary
activity have little to do with the motive for private material gain.
Rather, the effects stem from the fact that mercenaries are unaccount-
able actors.80 Even in the absence of a profit motive, those who would
otherwise be mercenaries under the current definition are still likely to
abuse human rights, threaten state sovereignty, and contribute to
international crime to the extent that they are unaccountable to any
state authority. Terrorists, for example, act primarily for ideological
instead of monetary reasons, and yet these individuals clearly contrib-
ute to a host of security and human rights problems. Thus, the
international community proscribes terrorism even in the absence of a
motive for material gain.81 It is not clear why international treaties on
mercenaries should cling to a profit-motive requirement when legal
regimes that regulate other forms of non-state violence do not.
In addition to these analytical weaknesses, the profit-motive require-
ment makes prosecution under the U.N. Convention extremely diffi-
cult. This is because a prosecutor has to establish that the actor was
“motivated to take part in . . . hostilities essentially by the desire for
private gain.”82 The term “essentially” appears to require the prosecu-
78. See Daniel A. Buford, Marketing the Military: Should Soldiers Be Sold Like Soap?, MEDIA &
VALUES, Fall 1991, available at http://www.medialit.org/reading_room/article54.html.
79. See supra Part II.B.
80. See Zarate, supra note 21, at 119.
81. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation art. 1, Sept. 23, 1971, 24.U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 (proscribing acts of violence on civil
aircraft regardless of the presence or absence of a profit motive).
82. U.N. Convention, supra note 44, arts. 1(1)(b) & 1(2)(b) [emphasis added].
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tor to prove that the actor both had a subjective desire to make money
and that that subjective desire was more influential in causing the actor
to take part in hostilities than any other simultaneously held, subjective
motivations. Inherent difficulties involved in proving subjective motiva-
tion, combined with the mobility and secrecy of many mercenaries,
make it highly unlikely that prosecutors will be able to obtain the
evidence necessary to fulfill these requirements. Perhaps in part for this
reason, there have been no news reports of any prosecutions based on
the U.N. Convention since its entrance into force in 2001.83 The
difficulty of prosecution is particularly problematic because it has
dissuaded Western governments from joining the Convention.84 There
is simply no incentive to become a state party when the Convention is
unable to achieve its sole purpose.
C. Nationality and Residency Are Probably Irrelevant
The final problem with the U.N. Convention’s definition of “merce-
nary” relates to its non-nationality and non-residency requirements.
Under both Article 1(1)(c) and 1(2)(c), a mercenary can be “neither a
national nor a resident of the State against which [an act of violence] is
directed.” An accountability-based definition may reasonably omit
these requirements.
The main reason for rejecting the non-nationality and non-residence
requirements is that, again, accountability is ultimately the key determi-
83. This is true even though there is anecdotal evidence that mercenaries are operating from
the territory of some states parties, see Saakashvili Urges Abashidze to Keep Mercenaries Out of Adzharia,
ITAR-TASS NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 24, 2004 (discussing how mercenaries may be traveling from
Ukraine to fight in Georgia), and even though national governments have had opportunities to
try mercenaries as such, see Equatorial Guinea: Prosecution for Death Penalty Against Mercenaries, BBC
MONITORING AFRICA - POLITICAL, Aug. 24, 2004 (explaining that Equatorial Guinea chose to
prosecute mercenaries for “offence[s] against the head of state, attempt to overthrow the
government, change the form of government, undermining the peace and independence of the
country, illegal possession and stocking of weapons and ammunitions as well as terrorism and
subversive activities and treason,” but conspicuously implying that Equatorial Guinea will not
prosecute also for the defendants’ status as mercenaries); Michael Wines, Zimbabwe Frees 62 Coup
Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2005, at A3 (explaining that Zimbabwe convicted numerous South
African mercenaries for firearms and immigration violations, again conspicuously implying that
Zimbabwe did not convict the mercenaries for their status as mercenaries).
84. See, e.g., U.K. Green Paper, supra note 2, at 22 (“The UK, in common with most other
Western Governments, has not become a party to the Convention mainly because it does not
believe that it could mount a successful prosecution based on the definitions in the Convention.
This is because of the extreme difficulty of establishing an individual’s motivation beyond
reasonable doubt.”).
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nant of whether private violence is problematic, and—like profit
motive—neither nationality nor residence necessarily indicates any-
thing about a private soldier’s accountability. On one hand, persons
who are neither nationals nor residents of a state against which they
perpetrate violence may still be accountable in many circumstances.
Despite some significant reports of misbehavior, U.S.-based private
military firms operating in and out of Iraq may provide an example.85
Most employees of these firms are presumably neither Iraqi nationals
nor residents, but they still face a variety of legal and reputational
constraints that limit their ability to use force without regard to state
policy.86 On the other hand, persons who are both nationals and
residents of a target state may nevertheless be entirely unaccountable.
Citizens of Afghanistan, for example, are in many areas able to perpe-
trate violence against their government with impunity.87 The regime’s
inability to control its territory and impose criminal sanctions on its
citizens allows those citizens to act largely as they choose. This point is
particularly important because the states that are most likely to face
mercenary threats—i.e., failed states and states encountering civil
war88—will on average be the least capable of capturing and prosecut-
ing their nationals and residents.
The non-nationality and non-residence requirements are also prob-
lematic under an examination of their drafters’ intent. Drafters of
Protocol I, who inspired the drafters of the U.N. Convention, appear to
85. For a general discussion on private military firms in Iraq, see James Dao, Eric Schmitt,
and John F. Burns, Private Guards Take Big Risks, for Right Price, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2004, at A9
(noting that “[a]s many as two dozen companies, employing as many as 15,000 people, are
working in Iraq”).
86. Eugene B. Smith, The New Condottieri and US Policy: The Privatization of Conflict and Its
Implications, PARAMETERS, Winter 2002-3, at 104, 113, available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/
usawc/Parameters/02winter/smith.pdf. But see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REBUILDING
IRAQ: ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE USE OF PRIVATE SECURITY PROVIDERS 20 (2005) (explaining that
“U.S. forces in Iraq do not have a command and control relationship with private security
providers or their employees,” and that coordination between U.S. forces and private contractors
is at times inadequate); T. Christian Miller, Private Security Guards in Iraq Operate with Little
Supervision, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, at A1 (reporting that, under a 2004 order issued by the
Coalition Provisional Authority, contractors involved in wrongdoing in Iraq are to be prosecuted
in their home countries, but also explaining that many U.S. contractors have not yet faced
prosecution despite strong evidence of misconduct).
87. Pamela Constable, Afghans’ Goals Facing Renewed Threats, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2003, at A9.
88. It is noteworthy that the majority of states currently dealing with mercenary activity are
suffering from broad social or political instability. See supra Part II.A (listing Chechnya, Georgia,
Sierra Leone, Papua New Guinea, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Equitorial Guinea as states where
mercenary activity has recently occurred).
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have inserted the requirements in order to help protect the individual
who joins her own country’s military solely for monetary reasons.89 The
problem is that this rationale is only persuasive if we approve of the
profit-motive requirement. Having rejected that requirement above,
the non-nationality and non-residence requirements lose their co-
gency. It seems unreasonable to retain requirements that were initially
inserted to help make practical a flawed emphasis on profit motive.
The only remaining question is whether there were any other
rationales that the drafters simply failed to articulate. Drafters may have
included the non-nationality and non-residency requirements on the
assumption that states are more likely to encounter violence from
foreigners than from their own citizens and residents. On this assump-
tion, the requirements focus the application of the U.N. Convention on
the most likely sources of unaccountable military violence. Yet, non-
nationality and non-residency in fact have little to do with an individu-
al’s propensity for mercenary activity. Independent of these traits,
individuals simply may or may not support a government. This observa-
tion is particularly true of the last fifteen years, a period during which
factors such as globalization and ethnic division90 have significantly
attenuated the bonds between states and their citizens.91 If the drafters
of the Convention hoped to target the individuals most likely to engage
in unaccountable violence, recent conflicts seem to indicate that
nationals and residents are similarly capable of offense, and thus—in
terms of the risk presented—similarly justifiable targets for regula-
tion.92
Alternatively, drafters may have included the non-nationality and
non-residence requirements in order to respect state sovereignty and
ensure that national governments retain jurisdiction over mercenary
activity carried out by their own citizens and residents. Some states may
have believed that the international criminalization of unaccountable
military violence among the nationals and residents of targeted states
89. Henry W. Van Deventer,Mercenaries at Geneva, 70 AM. J. INT’L L. 811, 813-14 (1976).
90. See ROBERT H. WIEBE, WHO WE ARE: A HISTORY OF POPULAR NATIONALISM 209-10 (2001)
(explaining that nationalism is in decline and that, outside of Europe, competing ideologies are
likely to prevail).
91. See generally IAN CLARK, GLOBALIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION (1997) (arguing that globaliza-
tion undermines nationalism and other traditional loyalties).
92. See, e.g., Michael R. Gordon, Shifting Fronts, Rising Danger: The Afghan War Evolves, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2001, at A1 (describing the need for U.S. action to counter violence from both
Taliban rebels and foreign brigades in Afghanistan); James Risen & David E. Sanger, Border Clashes
as U.S. Pressures Syria over Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2005, at A1 (citing U.S. intelligence reports to
explain that about ninety-five percent of the insurgents in Iraq are Iraqi citizens).
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would inject excessive international influence into otherwise purely
domestic conflicts. Yet this view, too, has significant limitations. One is
that mercenary activity seems most likely to occur in weak states that are
particularly unable to bring mercenaries to justice.93 The result is that,
as explained above, the non-nationality and non-residency require-
ments render the treaty useless in precisely those contexts where a legal
framework for international assistance would be most valuable.
The other problemwith the potential sovereignty-based rationale is that
eliminating the non-nationality and non-residency requirements would
not itself allow greater interference with state sovereignty under the
authority of the Convention. Even if private soldiers fighting against their
own governments are mercenaries, nothing in the U.N. Convention
creates an obligation for other states parties to intervene in the internal
affairs of a targeted state simply due to the presence of mercenaries. The
Convention’s jurisdictional provisions only require a state to act when the
defendant is one of its nationals, or when the defendant is located in its
territory.94 Rather than viewing these provisions as a source of unjustified
foreign interference, it seems that a targeted state would welcome the
proposed definition as a way of making it easier to capture and prosecute
mercenaries. The definition would, for example, help states parties to take
advantage of the Convention’s information-sharing provisions, both in
conflicts that involve foreign mercenaries and conflicts that involve only
domestic participants.95
93. Cf. supra Part II.A.
94. SeeU.N. Convention, supra note 44, art. 9.
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over any of the offences set forth in the present Convention which are
committed:
(a) In its territory or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;
(b) By any of its nationals or, if that State considers it appropriate, by those
stateless persons who have their habitual residence in that territory.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over the offences set forth in articles 2, 3 and 4 of the present Convention in
cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does note extradite him
to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article.
3. The present Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in
accordance with national law.
Id.
95. See id. art. 8 (“Any State Party having reason to believe that one of the offences set forth in
the present Convention has been, is being or will be committed shall, in accordance with its
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If anything, customary international law—not the U.N. Convention
under the proposed definition—is the most likely source of interfer-
ence for states concerned about retaining exclusive jurisdiction over
their nationals and residents. Non-targeted states may be able to assert
jurisdiction over the nationals or residents of targeted states as a matter
of custom. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law explains that
“[t]here is wide international consensus that the links of territoriality
or nationality, while generally necessary, are not in all circumstances
sufficient conditions for the exercise of [prescriptive] jurisdiction.”96
Non-targeted states will thus not necessarily be excluded from exercis-
ing jurisdiction. These states may have a legitimate claim to jurisdiction
on the basis of the effects and passive personality principles because
mercenary activity in one state can destabilize and target the nationals
of others. Nationality and residency would typically outweigh claims to
jurisdiction based on these principles, but mercenary activity in what
will often be failed states may present a unique case. Section 403(2) of
the Restatement explains that “all relevant factors” will determine the
reasonability of state claims to jurisdiction.97 Certainly one relevant
consideration should be a state’s inability to suppress activities that
adversely affect the security of other states.98
IV. TOWARD AN ACCOUNTABILITY-BASED DEFINITION
Despite the shortcomings of the U.N. Convention’s definition of
“mercenary,” specific proposals for an alternate definition are lacking.
Commentators have long criticized some of the basic components of
the modern definition of “mercenary.”99 Some have identified merce-
nary activity as fundamentally a problem of unaccountability.100 At least
national law, communicate the relevant information, as soon as it comes to its knowledge, directly
or through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the States Parties affected.”).
96. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 cmt. a
(1987).
97. Id. § 403(2).
98. In this situation, § 402(3) may be the appropriate basis for prescriptive jurisdiction. That
section provides that “a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to . . . certain conduct
outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the security of the state or
against a limited class of other state interests.” Id. § 402.
99. H.C. Burmester, The Recruitment and Use of Mercenaries in Armed Conflicts, 72 AM. J. INT’L L.
37, 37-38 (1978) (recognizing the difficulty of defining mercenarism and criticizing the profit-
motive requirement).
100. See, e.g., Zarate, supra note 21, at 119 (explaining that “state accountability” is one of the
key determinants of acceptable private military activity, but choosing not to provide a specific
definition of “mercenary” based on that insight).
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one has proposed a specific alternative to the current definition.101
None, however, have both recognized that mercenary violence is an
accountability problem and specifically proposed an alternate defini-
tion that transforms accountability into the crucial determinant of
mercenary status. For the most part, the literature has also failed to
reconcile the need to create a definition that is analytically sound with
the practical necessity of obtaining state support.102 This Part aims to
remedy these shortcomings by proposing a definition of “mercenary”
that hinges on the absence of a private soldier’s accountability to a
national government. The Part first lays out the contours of this new
definition and explains how to operationalize the concept of legal
accountability. It concludes by discussing the various advantages and
potential disadvantages that are likely to be associated with the pro-
posed definition.
A. An Accountability-Based Definition
TheU.N. Convention’s definition of “mercenary” should be reformu-
lated to account for non-traditional security threats and focus on the
fundamental problem of unaccountability. On the security issue, the
reformulation should recognize as “mercenary” those individuals who,
101. The only specific proposal in the literature provides the following:
A mercenary is a person who takes a direct part in military activities:
(a) in a country or territory of which he is not a citizen or subject; other than engaging
in armed self-defense of state officials or private persons under rules of engagement
permitting proportionate return of fire if fired upon or upon reasonable belief of
imminent threat to the life or safety of the protected person or persons, such use of
force in self-defense to be limited to the use of side arms or firearms limited against
enemies in visual range; and
(b) is motivated to take part by the desire for private monetary or material gain; and
(c) acts independent of any legal obligation, regulation, or order by the state of which
he is a citizen or subject to participate in such activity. (Active duty members of a state’s
armed forces, participating with consent of their government on official duty are in any
event not mercenaries, regardless of whether they are citizens or subjects.)
Frye, supra note 5, at 2658. It should be noted that this definition retains the requirements of
profit motive, non-nationality, and non-citizenship. As explained in supra Part II, none of these
requirements closely correlate with the defendant’s accountability or, accordingly, culpability.
102. Compare Frye, supra note 5, at 2658 (retaining requirements—such as private profit
motive—that complicate treaty enforcement), with U.K. Green Paper, supra note 2, at 22
(explaining that the U.N. Convention lacks support from national governments in large part
because it is difficult to enforce).
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even in the absence of specific intent, use violence that overthrows a
government, that undermines a state’s constitutional order or territo-
rial integrity, or that otherwise conflicts with state security or interna-
tional law. On the accountability issue, the new definition should
abandon the private profit-motive requirements of Articles 1(1)(b) and
1(2)(b) and eliminate the non-nationality and non-residency require-
ments of Articles 1(1)(c) and 1(2)(c).
The new definition should also explicitly make the absence of
accountability a defining feature of the mercenary soldier. Given the
problems associated with Keohane’s hierarchical, market, and public-
reputational forms of accountability in this context, the definition will
need to focus on the absence of legal accountability.103 A proper
approachmight be to add the requirement that a mercenary is one who
operates without legal approval and direction from a government. This
requirement would mean, for example, that military firms or other
private fighters that contract with or receive licenses from a govern-
ment are not mercenaries and thus not subject to the terms of the U.N.
Convention. The rationale in this context is that the license or contract
that governs the relationship between the government and the private
fighter renders that person accountable and avoids the fundamental
problem with private military action.
The following definition incorporates these reforms:
A mercenary is any person who, in any situation:
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the pur-
pose of participating in a concerted act of violence
aimed at, or having the reasonably foreseeable effect of:
(i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise un-
dermining the constitutional order of a State;
(ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a State;
or
(iii) Causing or aiding and abetting any acts otherwise
criminal under international law.
(b) Has not been sent by a State on official duty;
(c) Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on
whose territory the act is undertaken; and
103. U.S. law has adopted a similar textual approach to the definition of some unrelated
legal statuses. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2773a(b)(2) (2002) (“An employee or member of the armed
forces described in this subsection is an employee or member who . . . (2) is not otherwise
accountable under subtitle III of title 31 or any other provision of law for payments made on the
basis of . . . vouchers.”) (emphasis added).
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(d) With regard to the said concerted act of violence, is not
otherwise legally accountable to [a / his or her own]104 govern-
ment by means of a contract or license whose parties are the
person and that government.
There are multiple notable differences from the current definition.
First, (a) now includes the language “or having the reasonably foresee-
able effect of” and, under (iii), “causing or aiding and abetting any acts
otherwise criminal under international law.” Another change is that
the proposed definition collapses the former Articles 1(1) and 1(2)
into one definition because they are largely repetitive and add nothing
to the scope of the Convention. Finally, the new definition eliminates
Articles 1(1)(b), 1(2)(b), 1(1)(c), and 1(2)(c) of the Convention. The
definition retains the former Articles 1(2)(d) and 1(2)(e) because
these are objective and useful indicia of legal accountability. The new
definition would presumably require drafters to rework some other
provisions of the U.N. Convention, but this Note sets that issue aside for
the sake of topical focus.
B.Metrics for Legal Accountability
Assuming that the defining feature of mercenary status should be the
absence of legal accountability to a state, questions remain about how,
precisely, to define and operationalize the concept of legal accountabil-
ity. It remains to be explained what types of legal mechanisms states can
employ to create legal accountability, and at what point legal account-
ability mechanisms can be judged sufficient to remove private soldiers
from mercenary status. Clear answers to these questions are necessary
in order for the proposed definition to generate state support and
create an effective basis for prosecution.
Perhaps the most important mechanism for creating legal account-
ability is the legal contract between the private soldier and his or her
state sponsor.105 Contracts can hold private militaries legally account-
able by defining the respective duties of the parties, establishing
104. I am not sure whether to use the article “a” or the phrase “his or her own” to modify
government. For discussion on this point, see infra Part IV.D.
105. Cf. Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of
Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135, 142 (2005) (arguing that
contracts are one of three mechanisms that states can use to enhance the accountability of private
actors in international affairs); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1285 (2003) (explaining that contracting enables governments to incorporate
public values into the decision calculus of private actors).
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penalties for noncompliance or nonperformance, and triggering the
application of public laws that relate to the status of the government
contractor. In the United States, for example, the Military Extraterrito-
rial Jurisdiction Act enables the United States government to hold U.S.
defense contractors criminally liable for overseas misconduct.106 Thus,
even if the terms of a contract are inadequate, its mere presence may
help to net offending agents. Moreover, by linking the actions of a
private military to its state sponsor, a contract can force states to use
private militaries responsibly. The formality of a written contract in
particular may help parties to avoid misunderstanding, clearly articu-
late their expectations and standards, and deter violations by providing
for specific penalties. Whether a private soldier is a mercenary could
therefore reasonably depend on the presence or absence of a govern-
ment contract in a particular case.
Effective contracts with private militaries likely will need to contain
several features in order to establish legal accountability. First, they will
need to articulate clear performance standards, goals, and output
requirements. Each of these components will help to ensure that
private soldiers only operate as directed by their state sponsors. Specifi-
cally defining both desired and unacceptable conduct will enable a
contract to serve as a reminder of relevant laws of war, render those
laws more effective by articulating their relationship to the private
military in a particular context, help private soldiers to know precisely
what types of actions are permitted, and even establish standards more
stringent than those under the existing laws of war. Clear descriptions
of the state sponsor’s goals, on the other hand, will help to ensure that
private military action comports with state interests even when private
soldiers must exercise discretion in choosing the course of action due
to unforeseeably vague, ambiguous, or incomplete contract terms.
In addition to articulating goals and performance standards, a
contract will also need to establish the private military’s liability in cases
of nonperformance or noncompliance, including violations of the laws
of war. For egregious violations by individuals, criminal sanctions are
probably the most appropriate penalties from a deterrence standpoint.
For organizations, a form of respondeat superior liability that triggers
financial or other economic penalties may be the most effective be-
cause that approach will encourage organizations to train and regulate
106. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (West Supp. 2005) (criminalizing “offenses committed by
certain members of the Armed Forces and by persons employed by or accompanying the Armed
Forces outside the United States” and applying explicitly to contractors and their employees).
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their employees.107 The effect of these mechanisms will be to allocate
liability to private soldiers and militaries to the extent that they abuse
discretion or otherwise violate a contract’s terms. The very existence of
the contract, by contrast, will operate as a liability for a government
sponsor that misuses private military forces because the contract cre-
ates a control relationship between the sponsor and the private forces
that renders the sponsor accountable under the international law on
state responsibility.108
Some commentators have argued that even with clear articulations
of performance standards, goals, output requirements, and penalties,
contracts are limited in their capacity to create legal accountability.
One cited problem is that an agent such as a private military organiza-
tion may have incentives to comply only with the letter of its contract
because minimal performance lowers costs while maximizing the profit
of performance.109 Another identified problem is that contracts “do
very little to encourage the development of a professional ethos of
accountability” among private agents.110 Yet another possible objec-
tion, it seems, is that contracts are only as effective as their compliance-
monitoring mechanisms. With agents involved in secret military opera-
tions, monitoring difficulties could render contracts difficult to enforce.
While these critiques are reasonable, there are several reasons to
reject them. Most importantly, the desirability of the proposed defini-
tion of “mercenary” should be assessed in comparative terms, not solely
in a vacuum. The question should not be whether contracts are
foolproof mechanisms for generating accountability, but whether a
107. One approach here might be to adopt a doctrine similar to that articulated in In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). There, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a military commander has
a “duty to take such appropriate measures as are within his power to control the troops under his
command for the prevention of . . . violations of the law of war.” Id. at 15. Based on this doctrine,
the Court held that a Japanese military commander was strictly liable for violations of the laws of
war committed by his troops in the Philippines during World War II. Id. at 15-18, 26.
108. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res.
56/83, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Dec. 12, 2001)
[hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility], available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/
instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf. Article 8 states that the conduct of a “per-
son or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person
or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of,
that State in carrying out the conduct.” Id.While still mere drafts, the articles that attribute private
conduct to states, including Article 8, are “generally traditional and reflect a codification rather
than any significant development of the law.” Daniel Bodansky & John R. Crook, The ILC’s State
Responsibility Articles: Introduction and Overview, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 773, 783 (2002).
109. See Kearns, supra note 28, at 582.
110. Id.
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definition of “mercenary” that hinges on the presence of mechanisms
such as government contracts will be more effective than the current
definition at reducing unaccountable military violence. In other words,
is it easier to control the unaccountable use of military force by
requiring prosecutors to prove amercenary recruiter’s specific intent, a
mercenary’s desire for monetary gain, and a mercenary’s non-
citizenship and non-residency? Or is it easier to control the same
problem by relying on contracts that are admittedly fallible but objec-
tively discernable to prosecuting authorities? As discussed above, an
affirmative answer to the second question is justified not only because
the proposed definition facilitates prosecution once a trial has begun,
but also because, as explained below,111 the definition is more likely to
attract state support and thus the accompanying resources that make
prosecution possible.
Further, the proposed definition’s partial reliance on contracts is
justified even on its own terms. An agent’s incentive to comply only
minimally with contract requirements is not a reason to conclude that
the agent is unaccountable. He or she is simply no more accountable
than the contract requires. States remain free to carefully draft contract
terms to ensure that private soldiers carry out state policies in a way that
serves state interests.
The second critique, described above, that contracts do not generate
professionalism among agents is similarly dubious. A contract may be
unable to generate professionalism beyond that which is mandated by
its provisions, but contract-based penalties for nonperformance or
noncompliance would still help to deter the worst tendencies of private
military activity. Moreover, private military organizations and soldiers
who hope for future contracts have strong incentives to operate pre-
cisely as required. The possibility of future business would supply at
least some discipline to current exercises of discretion.
The final and most persuasive critique of contract-based accountabil-
ity in the context of private military agents is that compliance monitor-
ing is extremely difficult. Battlefield conditions, the argument goes,
may be unclear or change rapidly, and agents have strong incentives to
avoid reporting their own violations. The response is threefold. First, as
wars in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq have shown, abuses tend to
find their way into the media.112 Facing this risk, private military agents
111. See infra Part IV.C.
112. Colum Lynch, Ex-U.N. Officer Sues U.S. Firm over Dismissal, WASH. POST, June 23, 2001, at
A20 (describing a lawsuit related to sexual misconduct by a contractor’s employees in the
Balkans); Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Ariel Hart, Contractor Indicted in Afghan Detainee’s Beating, N.Y.
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would have strong incentives at least to avoid egregious violations of
their contracts. Second, even if reports of a violation never leave the
ranks of the private military organization involved, superiors would
likely discipline their offending subordinates for placing the organiza-
tion in legal jeopardy with the state sponsor. An agent’s employees
would therefore have some reason to comply with the requirements of
the state sponsor even if that sponsor is unlikely to find out about
violations. Finally, it is important to note that the problems associated
with operations conducted by a private military pursuant to a govern-
ment contract apply similarly to operations by national armed forces.
Regardless of whether private soldiers are involved, it will always be
difficult to monitor compliance with the laws of war, and it will always
be difficult to sufficiently train soldiers to avoid criminal activity on the
battlefield.
In situations where a contract appears incapable of independently
creating sufficient legal accountability, states may rely on other mecha-
nisms under the proposed definition. Licensing, for example, could
either replace or supplement contractual arrangements. As with the
system established under the U.S. Department of State’s International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR),113 states could require private
soldiers and private military organizations to apply for authorization
before exporting combat-related services. In doing so, the authorizing
state could regulate the nature and duration of the proposed service to
ensure that its provision serves state interests. Licensing would also
allow states to bar applicants with questionable backgrounds from
providing services. By doing so, states could reduce the risk of miscon-
duct after the license has been granted.
Like a contract, a license could render the licensee accountable by
establishing financial or other penalties in cases of misuse. Moreover,
once a state chooses to use licensing procedures for its private military
agents, there will be strong incentives for the state to license responsi-
bly. Incidents of misconduct by private soldiers are likely to raise
questions not only about why the soldier misbehaved, but also about
why his state sponsor supplied him with a license. Careful use of
licensing procedures would enable states to promote their interests
more effectively by reducing the risk of diplomatic embarrassments.
Having described the most likely tools for creating legal accountabil-
TIMES, June 18, 2004, at A1 (describing abuses by a contractor in Afghanistan); Kate Zernike,
Ex-Detainees Sue Companies for Their Role in Abuse Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2004, at A12 (describing
abuses committed by contractors in Iraq).
113. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (2005).
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ity, this section’s final step is to propose a standard for assessing the
sufficiency of legal accountability mechanisms in any given context.
Because the efficacy of these mechanisms will likely vary by case, none
of them should necessarily remove state-sponsored private soldiers
from mercenary status. At the same time, states parties to the U.N.
Convention should be able to assess ex ante whether their legal
accountabilitymechanisms are sufficient to distance their private soldier-
agents from mercenary status. A clear standard will allow states to
utilize private soldiers confidently when accountability exists, and it will
aid prosecution when private soldiers are insufficiently accountable.
One way to resolve the tension between demands for contextualiza-
tion and predictability is to recognize that legal accountability is in
some sense a synonym for state control. State militaries are legitimate,
and colloquially-defined mercenaries illegitimate, because the former
operate only in a manner that reflects official state interests, while the
latter at best occasionally do so. The reason for this difference is a
matter of state control; national armies alone are treated as legitimate
because states can control them to operate in accordance with national
priorities and to promote national welfare. Mercenaries, by contrast,
may promote any interest regardless of its compatibility with state goals.
In light of this difference, it is reasonable to evaluate the sufficiency
of a state’s accountability mechanisms by asking whether those mecha-
nisms enable the state to substantially influence how and when the
private military uses force. Mechanisms should be deemed insufficient
if they are unable to prevent the use of private military force when the
context or manner of such use is inimical to state interests. Prosecutors
trying to determine whether accountability was present in a given case
can ask whether a state’s contract or license in aggregate gave the state
an ability to direct with legal authority how, when, and where the
defendant used force. This approach is contextualized because it
requires a factual inquiry to determine mercenary status, but the
objective nature of legal control should also allow states to protect with
confidence entire groups of private soldier-agents.
Another possible way to determine the sufficiency of a state’s account-
ability mechanisms is to assess not only the degree of control that those
mechanisms confer to the state, but also the manner in which they
operate. Here, the appropriateness of the “mercenary” characteriza-
tion will grow proportionally with the attenuation, informality, and
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secrecy of the state-soldier relationship.114 This is because the tradi-
tional harms associated with mercenaries are more likely to occur as
private militaries act secretly and without close government supervi-
sion. Informality raises the risk of misconduct by leaving the private
military without any clear goals or standards to guide its conduct.
Indirectness risks diluting the state’s control by impeding communica-
tion and complicating the chain of command.115 And secrecy makes it
easy for the private military to hide its own abuses. On the other hand, a
public, direct, and formal relationship with a government should
protect private soldiers from mercenary status not only because the
state will be more capable of guiding soldiers’ conduct in that context,
but also because such a relationship makes it easier for the interna-
tional community to hold the state-sponsor accountable. In this sense,
sufficient legal accountability triggers other sources of accountabil-
ity.116 Legal accountability may enhance Keohane’s public-reputational
accountability, for example, if the former exists by means of a publicly
disclosed contract or license.
C. Merits of the Accountability-Based Definition
Adoption of the proposed definition would carry several benefits.
The first is that the definition would enhance the symbolic and
deterrent value of the U.N. Convention by making prosecution much
easier. One reason is that states concerned with limiting mercenary
activity would no longer have to prove either profit motive or specific
intent. The legal analysis would instead focus on the objective and
more pertinent issues of whether the alleged mercenary operated
under any legal mechanism that renders her accountable to a govern-
ment and whether the alleged mercenary’s acts would have any of the
reasonably foreseeable effects that are proscribed. The suggested
changes would also facilitate prosecution by allowing states to pursue
individuals recruited for a greater variety of violent activities.
114. See Elaine Ciulla Kamarck, The End of Government as We Know It, in MARKET-BASED
GOVERNANCE, supra note 39, at 257.
115. One implication of this point may be that private military organizations should be
prohibited from subcontracting work to other private entities.
116. See Dickinson, supra note 105, at 173 (explaining that contracting can “aid other
mechanisms of accountability”); cf. Janna J. Hansen, Limits of Competition: Accountability in
Government Contracting, 112 YALE L.J. 2465, 2474 (2003) (“In many ways, legal structures do not
contribute independent forms of accountability but provide a formal background to enforce the
accountability goals of the system as a whole and to allow the operation of other accountability
structures.”).
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The second advantage of the new definition is that it is more likely to
garner state support. As mentioned above, Western governments have
not acceded to the current U.N. Convention in large part because its
strict definitional requirements render it incapable of serving as an
effective basis for prosecution.117 The suggested changes should re-
solve this problem by making prosecution easier. Additionally, the
proposed definition should not raise national-security or sovereignty
concerns among states because the legal accountability element guaran-
tees that formally state-sponsored private actors cannot be labeled
mercenaries. The definition only reaches persons who are recruited to
use violence without any type of formal state approval—precisely the
individuals whom states are most interested in punishing.
Third, the above definition could allow states to argue that non-state-
sponsored terrorism is a category of mercenary activity and thus
punishable under the U.N. Convention. Non-state-sponsored terrorists
will typically meet the proposed definition of mercenary; the primary
difference is simply that influential legal definitions of “terrorist”
require an additional purpose to “intimidate a population, or to
compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain
from doing any act.”118 The proposed definition could thus serve as a
backup route for prosecuting terrorists otherwise not convictable due
to the difficulty of proving purpose to intimidate, the absence of a
comprehensive international convention on terrorism, or limits to the
various parochial anti-terrorism conventions.
D. Seven Problems and Potential Answers
Despite the above advantages, the proposed definition may give rise
to several concerns. First, the definition could be used to characterize
as mercenaries members of violent self-determination movements that
oppose oppressive regimes. This is an admitted shortcoming to the
definition. However, it is probably not fatal. On one hand, it may be
possible to add a clause that excludes participants in certain forms of
self-determination movements from the scope of the proposed defini-
tion. The only problem is that it is difficult to imagine precisely what
that clause should say. Validating any violent self-determination move-
ment, it seems, could galvanize and tacitly lend legitimacy to less
justifiable movements in other contexts, and it would be difficult to
117. SeeU.K. Green Paper, supra note 2, at 22.
118. See Ad Hoc Comm. Est. by G.A. Res. 51/210 of 17 Dec. 1996, Draft Comprehensive
Convention on International Terrorism, art. 2(1), U.N. Doc. A/57/37 (Feb. 11, 2002).
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enforce fair standards for deciding when non-state violence is defen-
sible. The concept of an exception for participants in limited forms of
violent self-determination movements is not itself problematic, but its
implementation very well could be. Although it is difficult to imagine
language that would avoid serious enforcement problems, commenta-
tors more creative than I may be able to create a workable exception.
Assuming for the sake of argument that such an exception is not
possible, a categorical prohibition on non-state-accountable violence
may be justifiable. It is widely accepted, for example, that states
appropriately monopolize the authority to determine the legitimate
use of force.119 Without such a monopoly, it is likely that neither
democracies nor market economies could function. Additionally, self-
determination movements may still achieve their aims without resort-
ing to violence. Opponents of a variety of regimes across modern
history have been able to substitute violence with tools such as interna-
tional pressure, public opinion, and economic leverage in order to
achieve their aims. Native citizens of India used some of these tactics to
achieve independence from their British colonizers in 1947.120 Moroc-
cans acted similarly to achieve independence from France in 1956,121
as did Lithuanians with regard to the Soviet Union in 1990122 and
citizens of Lebanon with regard to Syria most recently.123 We should
not be too ready to condone the use of violence in light of this
precedent. Finally, even assuming that violence is justified for some
movements, it is possible that the benefits of an effective anti-
mercenary convention will outweigh the harms suffered by a small
119. Indeed, the very concept of the “state” assumes this monopoly. See MAX WEBER, THE
THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 156 (A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans.,
1947) (explaining that the possession of a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a certain
geographical area is a crucial attribute of states). For arguments justifying the monopoly, see
generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY (1981); Mancur
Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567, 568 (1993) (arguing that
stability is gained when violence is monopolized by a “stationary bandit” and governments are not
formed by voluntary entry into social contracts, but because of “rational self-interest among those
who can organize the greatest capacity for violence.”).
120. Tony Smith, A Comparative Study of French and British Decolonization, 20 COMP. STUD. IN
SOC’Y & HIST. 70, 96-97 (1978).
121. See generally Benjamin Rivlin, The United States and Moroccan International Status, 1943-
1956: A Contributory Factor in Morocco’s Reassertion of Independence from France, 15 INT’L J. AFRICAN
HIST. STUD. 64 (1982).
122. John M. Goshko, ‘Captive Nations’ Policy Yields to New Realities, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1990,
at A11.
123. Hassan M. Fattah, Last Syrian Units Pack to Pull Out of Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2005,
at A8.
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number of self-determination movements as a result of the new defini-
tion. As mentioned above,124 mercenary activity is increasingly preva-
lent around the globe, and it contributes significantly to a host of
security threats.
A second potential problem is that even with the new definition
there is no guarantee that parties will draft effective contracts to govern
the use of force by private militaries or that governments will issue their
contracts and licenses responsibly. In this view, governments may face
incentives to regulate their private-soldier employees just enough to
avoid liability for employing mercenaries, but no further. This criticism
may be persuasive with regard to crumbling regimes that have little
concern for international reputation or future legitimacy,125 but it is
probably not true for most other states. Governments concerned with
effective tactical planning will want to strictly regulate the missions and
manner of conduct of their private agents in most cases. Failure to do
so could not only create public-relations problems,126 but also under-
mine a government’s ability to win battles. Additionally, the proposed
definition gives states a uniquely strong incentive to effectively regulate
their private soldiers because failure to do so may expose the soldiers to
prosecution under the Convention and call into question the legiti-
macy of the state’s authorization to use force. In doing so, the defini-
tion could help to resolve current problems with unaccountability
among private military corporations in places such as Iraq.127
Third, even with the new definition, there is still a potential for states
to employ private soldiers to attack other states or engage in otherwise
destabilizing or abusive activities. The proposed definition would admit-
tedly do nothing to proscribe those actions because the private soldiers
involved would presumably hold some type of formal legal relationship
with their employer government. However, this argument is not a
reason to reject the proposed definition. Adopting a definition of
“mercenary” that includes state-sponsored militaries would be unwork-
able due to the likelihood of strong state opposition and the difficulty
of distinguishing between mercenaries and traditional soldiers. More-
over, even if some soldiers cannot be held accountable under the U.N.
124. See supra Part II.
125. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 45 (1980) (discussing how a state’s
incentives for future cooperation will significantly shape its current behavior toward other states).
126. John Tierney, Hot Seat Grows Lukewarm Under Capital’s Fog of War, N.Y. TIMES, May 20,
2004, at A14 (quoting Senator Byrd on how abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib by private security
firms has dealt a significant blow to U.S. prestige and the U.S. public relations campaign in Iraq).
127. SeeWayne, supra note 18.
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Convention by virtue of their state sponsorship, the state sponsor can
be held accountable by the international community under the law of
state responsibility.128 As the identities of potential state sponsors are
widely known, static, and finite, it should—in comparison to the
difficulty involved in identifying and tracking down individual merce-
naries—be easy for the international community to impose on misbe-
having states punishments such as sanctions, public condemnation,
and/or the use of force. The possibility of receiving such punishments
gives states ample reason to use private militaries judiciously.
While it is conceivable, moreover, that the potential for liability
would simply encourage states to evade sanction by maintaining only
covert and informal relationships with the private militaries they hire,
this result is unlikely. Private soldiers would be reluctant to work for
governments in the absence of a formal contract or license because
informality would expose those soldiers to criminal liability for merce-
nary status. Additionally, the U.N. Convention not only criminalizes
mercenary actions, but also any state sponsorship of such actions,
whether formal or informal. Article 5(1) states that “States Parties shall
not recruit, use, finance or train mercenaries and shall prohibit such
activities in accordance with the provisions of the present Conven-
tion.”129 The phrase “recruit, use, finance or train” covers most conceiv-
able relationships between states and private militaries and does not
appear to require any level of relational formality or legal accountabil-
ity in order to trigger state responsibility. Thus, regardless of the nature
of the relationship between the state and the private soldier, the state
itself can become liable; the question is simply how. If the relationship
is formal and the private military legally accountable to its sponsor, that
military will not be mercenary, and state liability will only arise if the
state’s use of the private force otherwise violates some aspect of
international law. If the relationship is informal and the private military
legally unaccountable to its sponsor, that military becomes mercenary,
and the state becomes liable under Article 5 of the U.N. Convention.
Fourth, many commentators would criticize the accountability-based
definition for legitimizing legally accountable private military organiza-
tions. According to these commentators, private military organizations
are categorically problematic because they undermine the morale of
national armed forces and complicate national military strategies,130
128. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 108, art. 8.
129. U.N. Convention, supra note 44, art. 5(1).
130. SeeMichaels, supra note 5, at 1095-98.
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allow governments to circumvent traditional democratic and constitu-
tional checks on the use of force,131 and tend to violate human
rights.132 While it should be noted that the policy debate over the
wisdom of relying on private military organizations is far from de-
cided,133 this Note sets aside that well-worn discussion and asks the
reader instead to consider two possibilities. First, assume that, based on
the policy analysis carried out elsewhere, private military organizations
are in fact useful to states and generally beneficial for a variety of
strategic, economic, and legal reasons. If this is the case, the proposed
definition is not at all problematic, as it allows states to distance private
soldiers from mercenary status by contracting with firms that on
balance confer net social benefits. Second, assume in the alternative
that private military organizations are undesirable from a policy stand-
point. Even if that were true as an academic matter, a wide variety of
national governments are convinced that private militaries are strategi-
cally quite useful,134 and these governments are unlikely to discontinue
their use. The question, then, is not whether the proposed definition is
problematic in light of the arguable and abstract undesirability of
private military organizations, but whether the definition is justified as
a more effective way to control unaccountable military violence in a
world where the private military organization has become a well-settled
institution in international affairs. Even if legally accountable private
military organizations are bad, unaccountable private military organiza-
tions are worse. The proposed definition may validate the operations of
some private military organizations, but, in doing so, it enhances the
ability of states to counter the most egregious forms of private military
violence.
The fifth potential problem is that states may resist the proposed
definition due to its tendency to enhance state accountability for the
acts of private soldiers. The soldier’s legal accountability in effect
heightens the state’s accountability to public opinion and the interna-
tional community by formally bonding the state sponsor and agent.
While states may be eager to control the unaccountable use of force,
131. See, e.g., id. at 1062-83.
132. See Dickinson, supra note 105, at 151-53.
133. See, e.g., id. at 189 (arguing that “when the government privatizes military functions,
individuals seeking redress may actually have more avenues to pursue legal accountability than
when the government performs military functions directly”); Zarate, supra note 21, at 150-52
(explaining the various benefits produced by private military organizations).
134. For an explanation of their perceived utility, see supra Part II.A and infra notes 136-142
and accompanying text.
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they are not eager to create greater liabilities for themselves. States may
also oppose the definition to the extent that it requires greater regula-
tion of private military corporations. The rationale for relying on
private militaries is that, in comparison to actual state militaries, they
lower the profile of the state sponsor, provide cost savings, and provide
the sponsor with greater flexibility in its decisions to use force.135
Regulation arguably mitigates these benefits.
Despite these objections, there are several reasons why states could
support the proposed definition over the definition employed in the
current U.N. Convention. First, as explained above, the accountability-
based definition is probably a more effective basis for prosecution. The
definition thus removes one of the primary reasons for anemic state
support for the current Convention. Second, contractual or license-
based regulation of private soldiers does not eliminate the comparative
advantages of reliance on private forces over state militaries. The use of
legally accountable private soldiers does not necessarily raise the
profile of the state sponsor, for example, because these soldiers will
operate under a different organizational name, wear non-state uni-
forms, and adhere to contracts or licenses that are far less visible than
the public deployment of a national military. As long as contracts and
licenses create sufficient legal accountability, evidenced by state con-
trol, these instruments do not necessarily have to be publicly disclosed.
Nor does the proposed definition eliminate the financial benefit of
reliance on private militaries. As one commentator has noted, contrac-
tors are less expensive in part because efficiency is their modus ope-
randi and in part because they do not encounter compliance costs
under the wide range of statutes and regulations that apply exclusively
to government actors.136 For example, as a non-public entity, a private
military organization in the United States is not subject to require-
ments under the Administrative Procedure Act.137 As a result, many
constraints typically encountered by federal agencies—e.g., notice and
comment procedures138 and reporting requirements under the Free-
dom of Information Act139—do not apply. In the United States, a
private military’s non-public status also potentially allows it to avoid
135. See Michaels, supra note 5, at 1037-48 (describing traditional rationales for the use of
private military companies).
136. Id. at 1037-38.
137. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2000).
138. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
139. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
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Bivens liability.140 A contractual or licensing relationship with a state
sponsor will likely not change the agent’s position under these areas of
law. One final point on the issue of cost is that, even if the proposed
definition mitigates the financial rationale for relying on private forces,
there may be a tradeoff between the state sponsor’s interest in cost
savings and its interest in effective battlefield control. To the extent
that the latter is more important, states will have little reason to oppose
the proposed definition even if it raises the cost of hiring private
militaries.
The accountability-based definition is also unlikely to undermine the
flexibility that states enjoy in the use of private security forces. Much
like the cost savings referenced above, flexibility is largely a product of
non-public status, and a contractual or licensing relationship with a
national government does nothing to change that status. Flexibility
exists in part because citizens tend to exhibit less concern for the lives
of private soldiers than they do for soldiers in their government’s
armed forces.141 Sponsoring states are thus capable of deploying
private soldiers in contexts where the risk to human life would other-
wise be unacceptably high in relation to the weight of the interest
pursued. Flexibility also exists in part because statutory constraints tend
to apply more to the use of national armed forces than to the use of
private forces. Again using the United States as an example, the War
Powers Resolution applies only to the “introduction of United States
Armed Forces” into hostilities.142 Because the mere presence of a
contract or license does nothing to negate the private status of a private
military, it is unlikely that the proposed definition would eliminate the
flexibility that states appear to enjoy in the use of such forces.
140. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (establishing that
citizens can obtain damages for injuries caused by the unconstitutional acts of federal agents).
Whether or not private militaries may be held liable under Bivens depends largely on whether
their actions constitute “state actions.” The answer is not entirely clear. On one hand, the
Supreme Court has held that a Bivens remedy is unavailable against a private corporation that is
under contract with a federal agency. See Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 71
(2001). On the other hand, courts occasionally recognize actions taken by private entities as state
actions when the entities are specifically authorized to act by the government, carrying out public
functions or carrying out activities in close cooperation with the government. For an explanation
of these authorities, see Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169, 1172-83 (1995).
141. See Dickinson, supra note 105, at 191-92 (explaining that, by reducing troop deaths,
reliance on private contractors made it easier for the United States to intervene in Kosovo and
Iraq).
142. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1973).
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Sixth, proponents of the existing definition may argue that its
components, in aggregate, effectively indicate an absence of account-
ability, even if each component does not do so independently. In this
view, it is inapt to separately critique the definition’s components
because they do not operate in isolation. This is admittedly a reason-
able argument; soldiers who meet all aspects of the current definition
are in most cases not likely to be accountable to a state. However, there
are two reasons to nevertheless reject the non-nationality, non-
residence, and profit-motive requirements. First, the difficulty of estab-
lishing profit motive still stands as an independent reason for rejecting
that criterion. Prosecutors will be unable to punish unaccountable
military activity as long as that requirement remains. Second, because
none of these requirements on their own necessarily indicate anything
about a defendant’s level of accountability, a defendant could avoid
prosecution for reasons that are normatively irrelevant. Assume for
example that a defendant satisfies every part of the existing definition
except the non-nationality requirement—she has citizenship in the
failed state against which she will use violence. In that case, the U.N.
Convention would provide no basis for prosecuting the defendant, the
target state will presumably be incapable of doing so, and other states
will be barred from prosecuting on the ground of mercenary status
because the defendant is a national of the target state and thus not a
mercenary at all. The current definition produces this result even
though the defendant is unaccountable to any state, and even though
there is a strong moral argument that the defendant is culpable. A
hypothetical involving the profit-motive requirement produces a simi-
lar result.
To illustrate one final concern, imagine that a group of U.S. citizens
contracts to fight for a foreign government in a conflict that otherwise
does not involve the United States or its interests. The U.S. government
has not authorized the deployment. Assume also that the contract
involved contains terms sufficient to create legal accountability under
the criteria described above; the citizens are thus not mercenaries
under the proposed definition. In this situation, one could reasonably
argue that the citizens should still be characterized as mercenaries
because, although they are legally accountable to a government, they
are not legally accountable to their own government. There is a
reasonably strong policy argument that the unauthorized participation
of one nation’s citizens in a foreign conflict should be proscribed
regardless of their legal accountability to a foreign state because that
participation interferes with the foreign policy of the state of citizen-
ship and risks entangling that state in an otherwise unrelated conflict.
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It is hard to imagine that a government would not feel compelled to
respond, for example, if its own citizens were killed or mistreated
during the course of a foreign war. The potential effect would be to
escalate local or regional conflicts into international wars. To help
prevent this problem, the current language in part (d) of the proposed
definition, which allows a private soldier to avoid mercenary status by
means of legal accountability to “a government,” should arguably be
changed to permit only the private soldier who is legally accountable to
“his or her own government.” The rationale for this position is the same
rationale that motivates neutrality laws.143
The argument for the change seems compelling. There are, how-
ever, two issues that should determine our ultimate position on this
point. One is the empirical question of whether neutrality laws are
adequately drafted and enforced by the various national governments
around the world. If they are, then the change seems duplicative and
loses its primary rationale. If they are not, then the change could help
states to fill in gaps left by poor drafting or inadequate enforcement of
the current laws. Although it is difficult to reach a conclusion on this
issue without collecting data, my guess is that neutrality laws are
imperfectly drafted and enforced in at least some cases.144 The second
143. With neutrality laws, governments bar their own nationals from assisting or serving in
foreign militaries without authorization. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 959(a) (1994).
Whoever, within the United States, enlists or enters himself, or hires or retains another
to enlist or enter himself, or to go beyond the jurisdiction of the United States with
intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony,
district, or people as a soldier or as a marine or seaman on board any vessel of war, letter
of marque, or privateer, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
three years, or both.
Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1994).
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides or
prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military or naval
expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominion
of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom the United
States is at peace, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three
years, or both.
Id.
144. There is some basis for concluding that, historically, these laws have been selectively
enforced in the United States and abroad. See Paul W. Mourning, Leashing the Dogs of War:
Outlawing the Recruitment and Use of Mercenaries, 22 VA. J. INT’L L. 589, 598 (1982) (explaining that
both “international and U.S. laws regarding mercenaries have . . . relied on similar, selective
enforcement schemes”). It is unclear whether state practice has changed in recent years.
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issue is whether the change would enhance accountability. Here again,
the answer is somewhat uncertain. On one hand, lacking anything
other than a business relationship to its private soldier-agents, a foreign
government may be the most likely to demand strict compliance with
the terms of its contract or license. Factors such as the nationalism of
the sponsoring state and the unfamiliarity of the contracting parties
could reinforce this tendency. On the other hand, a foreign govern-
ment may bemore willing to use private soldiers from foreign countries
to carry out odious government objectives because the foreign face of
the soldier-agent helps to distance his acts perceptually from those of
the government-principal. A cautious approach to accountability may
use the phrase “his or her own government” in part (d) of the proposed
definition, but, of course, even then there would remain a possibility of
irresponsible deployment by mercenaries’ home states.
V. CONCLUSION
As a prominent form of non-state violence, mercenary activity is a
significant threat to international security. This Note has argued that
mercenary violence is also fundamentally a problem of accountability;
the associated harms largely occur when private soldiers operate with-
out the direction and control of a government. Unfortunately, the
definition of “mercenary” that is employed in Protocol I and the U.N.
Convention does not reflect this fact, as it includes several components
that are irrelevant to the issue of accountability. As a result, the related,
substantive treaty provisions are difficult to enforce and lack broad
state support. This situation is particularly problematic because law is
the one source of accountability that does not face inherent limitations
in its ability to manage private military violence. Without a redefinition
of mercenary status, mercenary violence is likely to continue as a
significant source of instability and abuse. This Note has sought to
resolve these issues and improve on the existing literature by proposing
a specific definition that transforms accountability into the central
determinant of mercenary status. To the extent that states are attracted
by a definition that facilitates enforcement and improves on the
analytical weaknesses of its predecessor, the accountability-based defini-
tion will strengthen international efforts to deter and punish merce-
nary violence.
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